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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
The nature of the case is a declaratory relief action filed by Piercy pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 10-1201, et seq., in which he challenged procedural irregularities in the creation of a herd

district enacted by the Canyon County Board of Commissioners in 1982, some 23 years before
the auto accident that gave rise to Guzman's lawsuit against Piercy and Sutton.
The question presented by Piercy' s appeal is how long is too long to wait to challenge a
herd district. Piercy takes the position that before the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-587,
there was no statute of limitation to challenge a herd district, school district, or road district. The
time frame for such a challenge, using his word, was "unlimited."
Judge Ford agreed that the catch-all statute oflimitation, Idaho Code§ 5-224, applied to
Piercy' s case before the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 31-587 in 2009 and gave the
amendment retroactive effect. Whether this Court applies the four year statute oflimitation of
Idaho Code § 5-224 or the retroactive seven year statute of limitation contained in Idaho Code §
31-587 is irrelevant: under either statute Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance is
too old.
While Piercy makes much of the procedural irregularities in the ordinance's enactment,
those irregularities are not really at issue in this appeal. The whole point of a statute of limitation
is to prevent parties from having to litigate matters which, because of the passage of time, are
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difficult, if not impossible, to litigate because of faded memories, dead or difficult to locate
witnesses, and missing or degraded documentary evidence.
Piercy never raised a word in protest to the 1982 herd district until he was sued in 2005
for this car accident. The implications of a ruling in his favor in this appeal are significant, as
such a ruling would invite civil and criminal defendants to defend their cases not on the merits,
but by attacking the procedures by which laws which have applied to them for decades were
enacted.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
Sutton generally agrees with Piercy' s the course of proceedings described by Piercy, with

some important qualifications. Sutton and Guzman have argued in favor of the validity of the
1982 herd district from the beginning based on the notion that Piercy' s challenge to the district is
too late. (See, e.g., R., Vol. 2, p. 283 (arguing Piercy's motion to void ordinance barred by
doctrine of estoppel by laches); R., p. 210 (arguing applicability of quasi estoppel)). Sutton has
argued throughout the life of the case that "[i]t is too late for Piercy, having benefited from the
herd district status of Canyon County for 25 years, to now complain about alleged technical
defects in the ordinance's passage because he finds himself in this unfortunate case." (R., Vol. 2,

p. 287.)
Because of the unique and complicated procedural posture of the case, neither Guzman
nor Sutton had the opportunity to assert defenses under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure until
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the district court ordered Piercy to file a declaratory relief action against Canyon County. (See
R., Vol. 4, p. 672, ifif 2 and 3.) The district court specifically approved the filing of the Amended
Action for Declaratory Relief attached to his order as Exhibit A. (See R., Vol. 4, pp. 673-677.)
That complaint specifically alleged there was a "justiciable controversy" between Piercy, Canyon
County, Guzman, and Sutton over the "herd districts," (id., p. 677, if XV.), which included both
the 1982 herd district from which Piercy's bull escaped and the 1908 herd district where the
accident happened. Piercy challenged the validity of both herd districts. (Id., p. 677, prayer for
relief,

if 5.)
Given the unique procedural posture of the case, the district court gave Canyon County,

Guzman and Sutton the right to answer Piercy's complaint and assert all defenses under the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (See R., Vol. 4, p. 672, if 4.)
Sutton and Guzman then pled one of the statute of limitations defenses (based on Idaho
Code§ 5-224) that Judge Ford ultimately ruled barred Piercy's challenge to the 1982 and 1908
herd districts. (R., Vol. 4, p. 702 (Guzman answer); R., Vol. 4, p. 718 (Sutton answer)). These
answers, filed in 2008, did not assert Idaho Code § 31-587 as a statute of limitations defense
since the amendment to that statute did not occur until the following year.
Even though Sutton argued strenuously for application ofldaho Code § 5-224 to Judge
Petrie in her post trial briefing (R., Vol. 5, pp. 911-920), Judge Petrie never made a ruling of any
kind on the defense, and left the bench shortly after issuing his decision in the declaratory relief
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action. (See R., Vol. 6, pp. 959-971.) Sutton and Guzman moved Judge Ford to reconsider the
statute oflimitations defenses because Judge Petrie never addressed them, and Judge Ford
granted the request on December 4, 2009, noting "this court finds that the statute of limitations
argument has not been fully considered and decided by the court." (R., Vol. 6, p. 1147.)
Sutton and Guzman argued the statutes of limitation on reconsideration, and Judge Ford
considered the arguments, including the argument based on the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code §
31-587, based on his authority under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) to consider new facts and law in the
process ofreconsidering "interlocutory orders entered by the court or its predecessor." (R., Vol.
8, p. 1405.)

C.

Concise Statement of Facts.
Sutton does not believe that the underlying facts - to the extent Piercy provides them - are

of much relevance to the issues before this Court on appeal, as Piercy objects to application of
the statutes of limitation found in Idaho Code § 31-587 and § 5-224 based solely on case law and
statutory law. While Piercy primarily covers the procedural history, including the potential
procedural irregularities behind enactment of the 1982 herd district, these facts do not answer the
question of whether the statutes apply to bar Piercy's challenge to this two-plus decade old herd
district.
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It does not matter whether Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance was
successful or not. The central point of Sutton's successful defense of that herd district is that
Piercy brought the challenge too late, regardless of the merits of his challenge.
As Piercy notes, the 1982 herd district was enacted by the Canyon County
Commissioners, before Sutton and Guzman were born. Sutton and Guzman were high school
students when the accident happened. Sutton, who got her drivers license in September 2002,
frequently drove Wamstad Road, where the accident happened. (R., Vol. 2, p. 292, ifif 2 and 3.)
She drove the road frequently at night. (Id.) Before the night of the accident she never saw any
"Open Range" signs on Wamstad Road or cattle warning signs. (The yellow sign with the
silhouette of a cow.) (Id.,

if 5.)

She had driven extensively in other parts ofldaho and seen those

signs, and understood them to mean that she needed to watch out for cattle. (Id.,

if 6.)

Growing

up in Parma she understood that cattle owners in her area of Canyon County had to keep their
livestock fenced in. (Id.,

if 7.)

The presence of Piercy's black bull on the road the night of the

accident was a complete surprise to her. (Id.,

if 8.)

Conversely, Piercy had farmed and ranched in Canyon County for 30 years. (Tr., p. 186,
11. 17-19.) He had around 260 cows in 2005 when the accident occurred, and about 20 bulls.

(Id., p. 187, 11. 12-16.) He farmed 450 acres at the time, and ranched another 340 acres. (Id., p.
187, 11. 17-20.)
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Although it is ultimately irrelevant to the statute of limitations arguments that the
teenager Sutton knew that the area where the accident happened was a herd district, while the
much older and experienced rancher Piercy claims he did not, these facts are provided to
demonstrate to the Court that Piercy's testimony that he had no idea that he had lived in a herd
district for 23 years when the accident occurred was very much open to question.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal is whether Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district is barred by
Idaho Code §§ 31-587 or 5-224.
Sutton waives her cross appeal.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review on Appeal
1.

Standard of Review for Grant of Summary Judgment Based on the Statute of
Limitations.

The determination of the applicable statute of limitation is a question of law over which
the Court has free review. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 153 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467,
469 (2012) (citations omitted). The factual findings upon which Judge Ford based his statute of
limitations rulings are subject to the substantial evidence standard. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho
212, 217, 280 P.3d 715, 720 (2012). 1

1

Though, Piercy has not challenged these findings on appeal.
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B.

Analysis
1.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Ruling that Guzman and
Sutton Did Not Waive Their Statute of Limitations Defenses .

Piercy argues that Sutton waived her statute of limitations by not timely asserting them
and by stipulating to waive them. Both arguments fail, and overlook that the essence of all
arguments made by Sutton and Guzman from the beginning of the case are time based. Quasiestoppel, laches, Idaho Code § 31-857, and Idaho Code § 5-224, are all based on the notion that
Piercy's challenge is too late.
Piercy is of course correct that a statute of limitations can be waived if not pled. See, e.g.,

Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). LR.C.P. 8(c) requires
that a statute of limitations be pled as an affirmative defense. There is no dispute, however, that
both Guzman and Sutton pled the defenses when given the opportunity by the district court.
Judge Petrie ordered Piercy to file a declaratory action against Canyon County and permitted
Sutton and Guzman to assert defenses under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (R., Vol. 4, p.
672,

if 4.)

Because the defenses were pled, Piercy's waiver argument fails.

With respect to Piercy's argument regarding the stipulation, the proper analysis of the
issue is the trial court's authority to enter and interpret changes to its scheduling order under
LR. C.P. 16(b). While there are no cases under Rule 16(b) in the annotations, cases interpreting
other provisions of Rule 16 review a trial court's rulings under an abuse of discretion standard.
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See, e.g., Lloyd v. DeMott, 124 Idaho 62, 856 P.2d 99 (Ct.App. 1993) (holding that trial court did
not abuse its discretion in limiting issues for trial under IRCP 16(c) and (d)(l)). 2
The parties stipulated to a schedule in the case on April 10 and 11, 2008. 3 That
stipulation, approved by Judge Petrie, set a deadline for amendments to pleadings of 120 days
before trial, which was set for October 8, 2008. Accordingly, when Judge Petrie ordered Piercy
to file a declaratory relief action against Canyon County on September 5, 2008 (R., Vol. 4, pp.
671-672, ifif 1 and 2), it was necessary for the parties to agree that amendments to the pleadings

after the amendment cut-off (which had long since passed) were permitted. Accordingly, in the
September 4, 2008 Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling, Sutton, Guzman and the
County agreed to "waive any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr.
Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief' (R., Vol. 4, p. 663, if 6), and Piercy agreed
conversely that his opponents "may Answer the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief filed by
Mr. Piercy as provided for in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." (R., Vol., p. 663, if 4.)
Judge Ford appropriately exercised his discretion in ruling that Sutton and Guzman had
not waived their statute oflimitations defenses by signing the stipulation. Judge Ford ruled that

2

The sequence of this Court's inquiry into abuse of discretion is: (1) whether the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
ofreason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000
(1991).
3

Sutton will file a motion to augment the record with this scheduling order.
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paragraph 4 of the stipulation was inconsistent with Piercy's position that Guzman and Sutton
waived statute oflimitations defenses, as it gave them both the right to answer Piercy's amended
declaratory relief complaint as provided for in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (R., Vol. 8, p.
1404.) In the district court's words, "[p]aragraph 4 appears to be inconsistent with the assertion
that the responding parties knowingly agreed not to assert a statute of limitations affirmative
defense particularly in light of their vigorous assertion of other affirmative defenses including the
estoppel arguments." (Id.)
Additionally, Judge Ford noted that if the litigants had intended such a waiver, "the
stipulation should have specifically stated that the respondents waive all statute of limitations
defenses. (Id.) In other words, in the district court's view, the language Piercy relied upon was
not specific enough to warrant the drastic remedy of finding that the defenses were waived. 4
Last, Piercy' s counsel in oral argument never rebutted that the undisputed purpose of the
stipulation was to modify the existing scheduling orders and permit amendments to pleadings by
both parties. By definition, and by its terms, the stipulation was never intended by any of the
parties as a dismissal of previously asserted defenses or waiver of future defenses. Undersigned
counsel provided the district court with additional information that the court considered in
exercising its discretion:
4

Because all the arguments made by Sutton and Guzman were arguably time based including the estoppel and laches arguments - taken to its logical extreme, Piercy could argue
that they waived all of their arguments in favor of the 1982 herd district. This, of course, was
never their intent.
-9-

Clearly, a context of that stipulation was allowing them to amend,
the cut-off for amendments to pleadings had already passed. And
that was the whole reason for including that language in that
stipulation to allow Mr. Piercy to amend so he could re-align the
parties and set this up to make sense to the Supreme Court in case
of us ending up there at some point in time in the future.
I certainly never had any discussions with Mr. Peck about waiving
the statute of limitations defense, that was never out there in
anything we did, Your Honor. And there would have been no
reason to have done that either, because we weren't in a position
where we had to bargain that way.
(Tr., p. 348, 11. 9-20.)
Counsel for Guzman argued similarly, and counsel for Piercy admitted that the statute of
limitations never specifically came up in discussions about the stipulation:
Mr. Walton: Josh [Evett] is exactly right, and Ryan [Peck] will tell
you, we never talked about statute of limitations in connection with
that stipulation. Correct, Ryan? We never did.
Mr. Peck: That term never came up.
(Tr., p. 375, 11. 11-14.)
Judge Ford acted well within his discretion in finding that Sutton and Guzman did not
waive their statute of limitations defenses by signing the stipulation. There was no reason for
either to waive those defenses. The purpose of the stipulation was to modify Judge Petrie's
scheduling order and permit amendments that were technically untimely under that scheduling
order. Furthermore, the stipulation and order expressly gave Sutton and Guzman the right to
plead their defenses, which they did.
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2.

Guzman and Sutton Were Entitled to Defend Canyon County's Herd District
Ordinance.

Piercy argues that Guzman and Sutton "have no standing" to argue that the 1982 herd
district is valid. See Appellant's Brief, p. 17. This is an odd position to take, as Piercy, in his
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief, alleged there was a "justiciable controversy" under
Idaho Code§§ 10-1202 and 10-1203 between Piercy, the County, Guzman and Sutton. (R., Vol.
4, p. 681, if XV.)
Piercy makes this two page argument without a single citation to case or statutory law.
Usually, a party's failure to cite any authority for its position would result in the issue being
waived. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho v. Eisenman, 153 Idaho 549, 286 P.3d 185 (2012),
citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (citations omitted) (holding
that issues "not supported by propositions oflaw, authority, or argument ... " are waived "if either
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.")
Piercy must do better than simply state a conclusion. Because he has not provided this
Court with authority for his argument, it is waived.
Assuming the argument is not waived, Idaho Code § 10-1202 gives Sutton the right to
argue in favor of preservation of the 1982 herd district. The statute reads as follows:
10-1202. PERSON INTERESTED OR AFFECTED MAY
HAVE DECLARATION. Any person interested under a deed,
will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or
any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise,
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may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder.
Idaho Code§ 10-1202 (Emphasis added.).
In the same way that the Idaho Legislature has given Piercy the legal right to challenge
the 1982 herd district, it has given Sutton the legal right to argue that the 1982 herd district
ordinance is "valid." Sutton's "rights" and "legal relations" are clearly at issue. If the 1982 herd
district is upheld, she will be able to ask the jury to find that Piercy is liable in some amount for
the injuries to Guzman. If the herd district is struck down, Piercy intends to argue that neither
Guzman or Sutton can argue that he bears fault for the accident.
There are three problems with Piercy's argument that neither Sutton or Guzman have
"standing" to argue in favor or the 1982 herd district. See Appellant's Brief, p. 17.
First, Piercy has provided this Court with no authority for his argument. His brief does
not cite a case, statute, or rule of procedure providing that a litigant in Sutton's position has no
"standing" to argue in favor of an ordinance. The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that "[t]he
argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on
appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and
the record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). If an appellant does not "assert his assignments of error
with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error
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are too indefinite to be heard by the Court." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146,
1152 (2010) (citation omitted). Piercy's "standing" argument fails these simply requirements.
Second, there is no basis to modify Idaho Code§ 10-1202, which unambiguously grants
"any" person whose "rights" or "legal relations" are affected by an ordinance to obtain a
declaration of rights. Piercy's argument essentially is that the district court could only consider
Canyon County's arguments in deciding whether the 1982 herd district is valid. By its plain
language, however, Idaho Code§ 10-1202 does not limit the right to obtain a declaration of
rights to the governmental entity whose ordinance is in question. If a statute is not ambiguous,
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska v. St. Alphonsus

Reg'! Med Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 505 (2011). Accordingly, this Court is
constrained by Idaho Code § 10-1202, and Verska, to hold that Sutton has the right to argue in
favor of the 1982 herd district's validity.
Third, and putting aside that she has standing by way of Idaho Code § 10-1202, Sutton
has standing under this Court's standing analysis. The doctrine of standing focuses on the party
seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. Miles v. Idaho Power

Co., 16 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989), citing Valley Forge College v. Americans
United, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's
jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
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concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This requirement of "personal stake" has
come to be understood to require not only a "distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a
"fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.
(Citations omitted.) Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763, citing Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).
Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763
(citation omitted).
Sutton has a "personal stake" in the dispute over the validity of the 1982 herd district
ordinance. If the ordinance stands she can argue that Piercy is at fault for the accident. If the
ordinance is struck down, Piercy will argue that as a matter of law he has no fault and is entitled
to dismissal from the case. There is no dispute that one purpose of a herd district is to protect
motorists and their passengers from livestock. Piercy argues that the 1982 herd district ordinance
was void, and he accordingly had no duty to keep his livestock off of area roadways. Suttons'
Volkswagen was totaled and her friends were badly injured. Piercy takes the position that he
bears no fault for his black bull standing in the middle of Wamstad Road on a dark night.
Sutton's "stake" in this litigation could not be more concrete and "personal."
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She has standing to argue in favor of the 1982 herd district ordinance.
3.

Idaho Code § 5-224 is a Catch-All Statute of Limitations that Applies to
Declaratory Relief Actions in the Event§ 31-587 Does Not Apply.

Piercy takes the district court to task for its ruling that Idaho Code § 5-224 applies
to challenges to herd districts. See Appellant's Brief, p. 18. Piercy claims that because Idaho
Code§ 31-587 is "more specific," Judge Ford's ruling regarding Idaho Code§ 5-224 is error.
The argument is not fair to Judge Ford's decision, in which he explained that "[i]f it is
determined upon appellate review that the statute oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code§ 31-587
does not apply to the facts of this case, this court concludes that as a civil action, declaratory
actions fall within the "catch all" statute oflimitations provision ofldaho Code§ 5-224." (R., p.
1412.) Hence, the accusation that Judge Ford's ruling on Idaho Code§ 5-224 is in error because
there is a more "specific statute" is misplaced, as Judge Ford recognized that the 2009
amendment to Idaho Code § 31-587 provides the specific statute oflimitations. Because Piercy
argued that the 2009 amendment was invalid because it was not retroactive and was
unconstitutional, Judge Ford made an alternative ruling on Idaho Code§ 5-224 so that the case
would not have to be remanded to him for further proceedings in the event Piercy was successful
in his appeal.
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To the extent Piercy's point appears to be that only the pre-2009 version ofldaho Code §
31-587 could contain a statute of limitations, 5 and that because it did not Idaho Code § 5-224 has
therefore never applied to challenges to the creation of herd districts, he is incorrect. The pre2009 version set forth a presumption of validity of creation or dissolution of various types of
districts. See Appellant's Brief, p. 19, citing Idaho Code§ 31-587 (1989 version). This version
of the statute provided that the presumption "shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state
ofldaho." (Id.)
There is no language in the pre-2009 version of Idaho Code § 31-587 that can be
construed as a statute oflimitations, nor can the statute's silence be construed as a legislative
command that Idaho Code § 5-224, the catch-all statute of limitations, did not apply.
This Court has held repeatedly in the recent past that courts do not have the authority to
construe unambiguous statutes. They must be applied "as written," whether a court likes the
result or not. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 265 P.2d at 505. 6 The pre-2009 version ofldaho Code§
31-587 does not contain a statute oflimitations. Accordingly, Piercy's argument that the more

5

Piercy writes, "Idaho Code § 31-857, prior to 2009, did not include a statute of limitation
that acted as a complete bar to an action." Appellant's Brief, p. 19.
6

Piercy's argument that the Statement of Purpose to the 2009 amendments is somehow
relevant to the issue presented is meritless. See Appellant's Brief, p. 20. No one disputes that
these amendments created a statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 31-587. By no stretch of the
imagination, however, does either that amendment or the statute's silence on a statute of
limitations before that amendment mean that only Idaho Code § 31-587 could have contained a
statute oflimitations before 2009, and that because it didn't there was no statute oflimitations
before then.
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specific language of the pre-2009 Idaho Code§ 31-587 prevails over the general language of
Idaho Code § 5-224 fails.
As determined by Judge Ford, if Piercy successfully argues that Idaho Code§ 31-587
does not apply, he must still contend with the plain language ofldaho Code§ 5-224.
Assuming that Idaho Code§ 31-587 does not apply, the argument that Idaho Code§ 5224 still bars Piercy from challenging the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance is a simple
one, based on the plain meaning of the relevant statutes.
The limitations of action statutes apply to all actions and special proceedings. The
declaratory judgment action constitutes a type of "action" limited by Idaho Code§§ 5-224.
Idaho Code § 5-201 sets forth the general statute of limitations provision:
Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed
in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accrued, except
when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.
Idaho Code § 5-201. There is no specific statute of limitations that applies to either a declaratory
judgment action, or to the underlying claim, therefore, the catchall provision applies.
Idaho Code § 5-224 is the catchall statute of limitations provision, which provides:
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be
commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have
accrued.

Idaho Code § 5-224.
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There is only one form of action in Idaho's civil courts: the "civil action." See I.R.C.P.
2. An "action" is further defined in Title 5, Chapter 2 to mean:
The word "action" as used in this chapter is to be construed,
whenever it is necessary so to do, as including a special proceeding
of a civil nature.
Idaho Code § 5-240.
An action seeking declaratory judgment is authorized pursuant to Rule 57 of the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 10, Chapter 12, Idaho Code, and constitutes "[a]n action for
relief... " under Idaho Code§ 5-224. Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states that
the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to declaratory judgment actions. A declaratory relief claim is
an "action;" the Supreme Court ofldaho has recognized this in writing "[t]his is a civil action,
albeit for a declaratory judgment." Smith v. State Board ofMedicine of Idaho, 74 Idaho 191,
194, 259 P.2d 1033, 1034 (1953). Furthermore, this Court awarded attorney's fees in favor of a
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which statute allows for
the recovery of attorney fees in "any civil action." 7 Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141
Idaho 415, 423-424, 111P.3d100, 108-109 (2005).

7

Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) states, in pertinent part:
In any civil action to recover on ... any commercial transaction unless otherwise
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs ... (emphasis added.)
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Based on the above, Piercy's declaratory judgment action is a "civil action" under Idaho
Code§ 5-201 and "an action for relief... " subject to the limitations set forth under Idaho Code §
5-224.
Where there is no fraud shown, neither the ignorance of a person of his rights to bring an
action, nor the mere silence of a person liable to the action, prevents the running of the statute of
limitations. Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, 100 P. 354, 355 (1909).
The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the policy underlying statutes of limitation:
"The policy behind statutes of limitations is protection of
defendants against stale claims, and protection of the courts against
needless expenditures ofresources." Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho
397, 402, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985). Statutes of limitation are
designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to
future litigation.

Wadsworth v. Department ofTransp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996). Additional
policy reasons for the imposition of statutory time limits for filing actions are set forth in Renner

v. Edwards:
It is eminently clear that statutes of limitations were intended to
prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning
which persons interested have been thrown off their guard for want
of seasonable prosecution. They are, to be sure, a bane to those
who are neglectful or dilatory in the prosecution of their legal
rights. 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, § 4, p. 8. As a statute of
repose, they afford parties needed protection against the necessity
of defending claims which, because of their antiquity, would place
the defendant at a grave disadvantage. In such cases how resolutely
unfair it would be to award one who has willfully or carelessly
slept on his legal rights an opportunity to enforce an unfresh claim
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against a party who is left to shield himself from liability with
nothing more than tattered or faded memories, misplaced or
discarded records, and missing or deceased witnesses. Indeed, in
such circumstances, the quest for truth might elude even the wisest
court. The statutes are predicated on the reasonable and fair
presumption that valid claims which are of value are not usually
left to gather dust or remain dormant for long periods of time.
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 19 L.Ed.
257; 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, supra,§ 4; Spath v. Morrow,
supra (174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581). To those who are unduly
tardy in enforcing their known rights, the statute of limitations
operates to extinguish the remedies; in effect, their right ceases to
create a legal obligation and in lieu thereof a moral obligation may
arise in the aid of which courts will not lend their assistance. Cf. 34
Am.Jur., 'Limitation of Actions,' § 11, p. 20.

Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838-839, 475 P.2d 530, 532 - 533 (1969), citing Wood v.
Carpenter, 101U.S.135, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879).
Under Idaho Code§ 5-224, an action "must be commenced within four (4) years after the
cause of action shall have accrued." In this case, the cause of action accrued the date the herd
district ordinance went into effect in 1982.
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that the statute of limitations in a case where the validity
of an ordinance is challenged begins to accrue the date of the ordinance's passage. Canady v.

Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830, 831 (1911).
In Canady the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations barred an action to
declare an ordinance null and void filed nine years after the ordinance's enactment. Id. In

Canady, the city of Coeur d'Alene enacted two ordinances in 1900, and another ordinance in
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1905 8 , generally for the purpose of vacating certain streets and alleys in the city, with the
understanding that the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company would establish and maintain a sawmill,
planing mill and lumber yard on the vacated streets. Id. Thereafter, the Coeur d'Alene Lumber
Company expended funds to build the lumber manufacturing establishment. Id. at 830. Plaintiff
had notice of the enactment of the ordinances and the expenditure of money in the construction
of the plant and did not object at that time. Id.
Plaintiff's husband owned certain lands bordering on or near the streets vacated by the
ordinances. Id. at 832. At some point, plaintiff succeeded to the interest of her husband and
brought action on June 15, 1909, to have the ordinances vacating the streets and alleys declared
null and void, to compel the defendants to remove obstructions from the streets vacated by the
ordinances, to enjoin the defendants from obstructing the streets in the future, and for damages.

Id. at 831. Defendants answered the complaint and denied that plaintiff was damaged by the
street vacation, denied that plaintiffs land was within the city limits, and asserted the statute of
limitations and estoppel. Id. at 832.
At the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendants moved for a non-suit, which was granted
by the court. Id. at 832. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court and held,
in part, that plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 830. In support of its
decision, the Court concluded:
8

0rdinance No. 71 was approved March 10, 1900; No. 75 was approved November 6,
1900; and No. 115 was approved March 29, 1905.
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We think, under the facts of this case, that this action is barred by
the statute of limitations: and that this action should have been
brought at least within five years from the date such cause of action
arose. We think it sufficiently appears that appellant sat by when
Ordinances Nos. 71 and 75 were passed in 1900, and more than
nine years before this action was commenced, and made no
complaint of any damages having been sustained to her property by
reason of said ordinances and the vacation of the streets. And,
again, in 1905, when Ordinance No. 115 was passed, she made no
protest or objection of any kind. She knew that the Coeur d'Alene
Lumber Company was expending a great deal of money in
establishing its lumber plant upon said blocks and a portion of one
of the streets, and made no protest of any kind whatever to the city,
and made no claim for damages to her property as resulting from
the passage of said ordinances. The first time she complained of
damage to her property, so far as the record shows, was when she
commenced this action, June 15, 1909. Howard Co. v. Chicago &
A. R. Co., 130 Mo. 652. 32 S. W. 651; City ofLogansport v. Uhl,
99 Ind. 531, 49 Am. Rep. 109.
Id. at 83 5 (emphasis added).
Under Canady, Piercy' s challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance is barred by the
statute of limitations. The Order Establishing Herd District was enacted December 10, 1982,
nearly 23 years before this action was commenced. Piercy did not raise this issue until after
Guzman filed a Complaint against Piercy for damages arising from the collision between
Sutton's vehicle and Piercy's black bull. Prior to the subject accident, Piercy never complained
of any damages sustained by reason of the herd district ordinance.
The purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent litigation of stale claims. See
Wadsworth v. Department ofTransp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996); Renner v.
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Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838, 475 P.2d 530, 532 (1969). Whether Piercy likes it or not - and in
spite of his evidentiary showings - the Idaho Legislature has deemed his challenge to the 1982
herd district as stale.
There are strong policy reasons supporting statute of limitations provisions for actions
attacking the validity of an ordinance based upon alleged irregularities in the ordinance's
passage. At some point an ordinance has to have finality. If ordinances can be attacked at
anytime based on procedural irregularities, without limitation as to time, then the door is open to
anyone to attack any ordinance no matter how old and no matter how much evidence has been
lost to time. There is no policy rationale supporting turning over a now 25+ year old ordinance
on grounds of procedural irregularity. After the passage of so much time, these types of issues
are a waste of judicial economy and resources.

4.

Idaho Code§ 31-857 Applies Retroactively to Prevent Challenges to Herd
Districts Decades After Their Enactment.

As Judge Ford noted, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-587 occurred after Judge
Petrie's initial decision but before a final judgment was entered. Accordingly, Judge Ford
considered the amendment and "new evidence" in the process of "reconsidering interlocutory
orders entered by the court or its predecessors." (R., p. 1405.) Piercy has not challenged Judge
Ford's power to consider new law and new evidence under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
1l(a)(2)(B).
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Rather, Piercy claims that the amendment only operatives prospectively from its effective
date, and argues that the amendment is not retroactive. See Appellant's Brief, p. 21. To the
extent that Piercy relies on legislative history to attempt to avoid the plain language of Idaho
Code § 31-587 (see, e.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 21 (noting no indication in minutes that the
amendments were retroactive); pp. 21-22 (arguing that Statement of Purpose's use of word
"establishes" proves amendment is prospective); and p. 23 (arguing that Legislature could have
expressed retroactivity in various different ways)) he again violates the central point of Verska,
supra, that courts cannot construe unambiguous statutes.
As Judge Ford found, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-587 is unambiguous. It is
retroactive and prevents challenging various types of districts once they are older than 7 years.
(R., Vol. 8, p. 1410 (finding a "literal reading of the plain language of the statute confirms ...
[retroactive application]").
Idaho Code§ 73-101 states "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared." Idaho Code § 73-101. "[A] statute is not applied retroactively unless
there is 'clear legislative intent to that effect.'" Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432,
745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987). A statute may also be applied retroactively where intent is "clearly
implied" by the language of the statute. Kent v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 93 Idaho
618, 621, 469 P.2d 745, 748 (1970).
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It has long been held by the Idaho Supreme Court that a statute does not have to use the

word "retroactive" to evidence clear legislative intent:
We think it is sufficient if the enacting words are such that the
intention to make the law retroactive is clear. In other words, if the
language clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the
intent to make the law retroactive is expressly declared within the
meaning of [Idaho Code§ 73-101].
Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 151, 140 P. 965, 968 (1914).
Since its original enactment in 1935, Idaho Code § 31-857 has included language making
it applicable to orders of the board of county commissioners made prior to and after the statute's
enactment:
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other
district has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be
created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by an
order of the board of county commissioners in any county of the
State of Idaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared
to exist, after a lapse of five years from the date of such order, that
all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of
such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant
said board in making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest
upon the party who shall deny, dispute, or question the validity of
said order to show that any of such preceding proceedings or
jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken; and such
prima facie presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in
the State ofldaho.
1935 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 79, § 1, p.134 (emphasis added).
The statute was subsequently amended in 1989 and in 2009. The 2009 amendment added
the following: "No challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order,
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shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order." Idaho
Code§ 31-857; see also, 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 43, § 1, p. 124-125.
Because the original 1935 version ofldaho Code § 31-857 expressly applied to certain
orders passed by the county commissioners prior to the effective date of the statute, so too does
the 2009 amendment. See Stuartv. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43-44, 232 P.3d 813, 822 (2010)
(because original enactment of statute included language making it applicable to convictions
prior to the statute's enactment, Court concluded retroactive language applied to amendments.)
To interpret the amendment as not applying retroactively would have the effect of nullifying the
retroactive language in the pre-2009 statute, which this Court does not permit. See Stuart, 149
Idaho at 44, 232 P.3d at 822.
The analysis under Stuart is really no different than the analysis of Verska. If the pre2009 version of Idaho Code § 31-587 applied to orders entered before its effective date, then so it
is with respect to the 2009 amendments.
The plain language of the amended Idaho Code § 31-587 controls. It provides:
"Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other district has heretofore been, or

shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by
an order of the board of county commissions in any county of the state ofldaho .... No
challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, shall be heard or
considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order." (Emphasis added.)
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By its terms the new Idaho Code § 31-587 applies to districts "heretofore" or "hereafter"
created. By its terms it applies to districts in existence before the 2009 amendment, and those
created after the 2009 amendment, just as the 193 5 version of the statute applied to districts
already in existence. The statute oflimitation now specified at the end of the statute plainly
provides that it applies to districts created by an order either before or after the 2009 amendment.
The statute is retroactive and applies to Piercy's case.
The enactment of the statute of limitations is to preclude challenges to old districts, and
can only be read to apply retroactively. Many districts, like the herd district at issue in this case,
were established twenty-five plus years ago, and society has ordered itself around the existence
of these districts. To assert the statute oflimitations only applies to districts created after July 1,
2009, does not make sense when the purpose of the amendment is to preclude challenges to old
districts. It was not the legislature's intent to grant another seven years to challenge procedural
defects in a one hundred year old herd district statute - such interpretation would not solve the
problem sought to be fixed by the amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 9 •
Piercy' s reliance on University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf ofHarris v. Pence, 104 Idaho
172, 657 P.2d 469 (1983), is misplaced. First, the case is distinguishable on its facts since the
statute at issue in that case (Idaho Code § 31-3 504) was not expressly retroactive, unlike Idaho
Code § 31-857, which applies to districts "heretofore" or "hereafter" created.
9

This absurd result is precisely what Piercy seeks here, as he has repeatedly challenged
the validity of the 1908 herd district where the accident in this case occurred.
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Additionally, the University of Utah case involved a situation where a statute of limitation
(Idaho Code § 31-3504) was reduced following the accrual of a medical indigency claim. In that
case the statute of limitation was changed from within one year of "discharge" from a hospital to
45 days "following the admission" of a person to a hospital. University of Utah, 104 Idaho at
174. In the instant matter there was no reduction of the statute oflimitations. Before the
amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 in 2009, the catch all statute oflimitation of four years
applied. See Idaho Code § 5-224. The 2009 amendment increased the statute of limitation of
four years to seven years.
Accordingly, the concern of University of Utah - shrinking a statute of limitation on an
accrued claim in the absence of express retroactive language - is simply not present here. The
case is inapposite, unless one accepts Piercy' s drastic claim that the statute of limitation for
challenging herd districts before the 2009 amendment was "unlimited." See Appellant's Brief, p.
23.
Last, Piercy's argument that the effective date of the 2009 amendment to§ 31-587
demonstrates it is not retroactive is flawed. See Appellant's Brief, p. 25, citing Woodland

Furniture, LLC v. Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 146, 124 P .3d 1016, 1022 (2003). First, the viability
of Woodland Furniture's holding that the "effective date" of legislation is a demonstration of
intent is questionable given this Court's 2011 holding in Verska, supra, that the plain language of
the statute controls. A statute's effective date is not part of the statute itself. Accordingly, under
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Verska, it is of no use in the interpretation of an unambiguous statute. Furthermore, implicit in
the holding of Woodland Furniture is the position that a statute intended to be retroactive would
have an effective date prior to when the statute actually became effective. This logical
impossibility weighs in favor of affirming the central holding of Verska that plain statutory
language controls.
Additionally, Woodland Furniture is inapplicable because retroactive effect is expressed
in the first sentence of Idaho Code § 31-5 87. The 2009 amendment applies to orders
"heretofore" or "hereafter" created, just as the original 1935 version of the statute applied to
districts already in existence.
Based on the foregoing, the statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 31-857 applies to this
case, and Piercy is barred from challenging the order establishing the 1982 herd district.

5.

Whether Piercy's Challenge to the Herd District is in the Form of a Claim or
Affirmative Defense Should not Matter, as the Ultimate Issue (is the District
Valid) Remains the Same.

Piercy argues that statutes of limitation do not "apply to pure defenses," and apply only
where affirmative relief is sought. See Appellant's Brief, p. 25, citing Morton v. Whitson, 45
Idaho 28, 260 P. 426 (1927).
Putting aside the holding in Morton, Piercy overlooks that his challenge to the 1982 herd
district ordinance is in the nature of a claim for affirmative relief. Piercy seeks a judgment that
the 1982 herd district is invalid, and that accordingly the area from which his black bull escaped
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reverts to open range and he has no liability, as a matter oflaw, for the accident. This is
"affirmative relief' in every sense of the phrase. Piercy' s declaratory relief action is a "civil
action" as defined by I.R.C.P. 2. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) requires a pleading setting forth a "claim for
relief," which Piercy has done.
Piercy is not a defendant with respect to the challenge to the 1982 herd district. He is the
Plaintiff, as he is the one challenging the validity of the law. He has asserted claims, not
defenses.
Morton appears to stand for the simple proposition that a plaintiff who sues a defendant

cannot defend an affirmative defense asserted by the defendant based on the statute of
limitations. Statutes oflimitations apply to claims, such as Piercy's claim challenging the
validity of the 1982 herd district.
The other arguments made by Piercy in III. A. 5. of his brief are unavailing.
Freiberger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141Idaho415, 111P.3d100 (2005) and Smith v.
State Board ofMedicine, 74 Idaho 191, 259 P.2d1033 (1953), were both cited by Judge Ford to

support his conclusion that a declaratory action is a civil action. That being the case, Judge Ford
found that Idaho Code § 5-224 applies to actions for declaratory relief. Piercy's faulting of Judge
Ford for relying on these cases (see, e.g., R., Vol. 8, p. 1412) is misplaced, as Judge Ford relied
on them for nothing more than the simple proposition that declaratory actions are "civil actions."
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Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141Idaho388, 11 P.3d 73 (2005), cited at
p. 28 of Appellant's Brief, supports Sutton's position, as it upheld application of a statute of
limitations in a declaratory relief action.
In/anger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002), cited at p. 28 of
Appellant's brief, is inapposite, as it dealt with the unique situation of whether a statute of
limitations applies to a city's unlawful conveyance of a portion of a city street. This Court has
long held that no statute oflimitations applies to a city's unlawful attempt to convey a portion of
a city street. In/anger, 13 7 Idaho at 50, citing Boise City v. Wilkinson, l 6 Idaho 150, 102 P. 148
(1909). This rule is based on the Court's decades old holdings in many cases that city streets are
public and "held by the municipality in trust for the use of the public." In/anger, 137 Idaho at 49.
In/anger did not hold that "the statute oflimitations does not apply to the challenge of the
validity of an ordinance." Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The case does not come close to a holding
that general. It is specifically limited to city streets.
Similarly, McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851P.2d953 (1992), does not
say that statutes of limitation do not apply to challenges to herd districts, or any other type of
district. No statute of limitations defense was asserted in that case. The issue was not before this
Court. While it is true that this Court in McCuskey held that county zoning ordinances enacted
without complying with state enabling statutes are "ineffectual" and "void," this Court did not
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address the issue presented by this case: At what point does a county resident lose the right to
challenge a herd district based on alleged procedural flaws in its enactment?
Idaho Code§ 31-857 now explicitly recognizes that, before seven years elapses, a
resident can challenge "all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such
order .... " After seven years, however, "[n]o challenge ... shall be heard or considered .... "
The Idaho Legislature has made a decision that, in spite of procedural irregularities in the
passage of a school, road, herd, or other district, after seven years those districts are beyond
challenge. Piercy has submitted no authority to this Court for the proposition that the Legislature
cannot do this. The Court must consider the implications of Piercy' s arguments, as he is
essentially claiming that under this Court's precedents the Idaho Legislature cannot place a
statute of limitations on challenges to procedural irregularities in the passage of a herd or other
district. If the Idaho Legislature has required the completion of various procedural steps to enact
a herd district, certainly it can set a time limit for challenges to those districts. Piercy cannot, on
the one hand, demand strict compliance with the Legislature's herd district requirements but then
attack the Legislature's restrictions on challenges to the creation of those districts. He must take
the good with the bad.
Both Idaho Code§ 31-857 and, in the alternative, Idaho Code§ 5-224, set a limit on the
time in which a county resident can challenge procedural irregularities in the enactment of a herd
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district. McCuskey never addressed the applicability of a statute of limitation. It is, accordingly,
not on point.

6.

The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 is Constitutional.

Piercy argues that retroactive application ofldaho Code § 31-857 violates his procedural
due process rights, as he "has an interest in being able to have his cattle roam in open range
without being subject to liability for accidents caused if his cattle wander onto the roadway."
Appellant's Brief, p. 30.
There is no merit to this novel argument. Piercy cites no authority for the position that
retroactive application of a statute of limitations is a procedural due process violation.
Furthermore, Piercy has no cognizable property right, and he had ample opportunity before the
accident involving his bull to challenge the herd district. He did not.

a.

Statutory Construction.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40, 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (additional citations
omitted). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of
establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of
validity." Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903, 71P.3d1040, 1050 (2003) (additional citations
omitted). Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 711, 518 P.2d 969, 973 (1974) (additional citations
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omitted). The legislature is presumed to have acted within its constitutional power. Worthen v.
State, 96 Idaho 175, 179, 525 P.2d 957, 961 (1974) (additional citations omitted).

The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must show the statute is
unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept.
Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433, 441 (2007) (additional citations omitted). A

facial challenge requires a showing that the statute in question is unconstitutional in all
applications and is purely a question of law. Id. (additional citations omitted). By contrast, an
"as applied" challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the
offending conduct. Id. (Additional citations omitted).
It appears Piercy is solely making an "as applied" challenge.

b.

The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 Does Not Violate
Procedural Due Process.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits deprivation oflife,
liberty, or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental conduct that offends
the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play." Maresh v. State, Dept. ofHealth and
Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 225-226, 970 P.2d 14, 18-19 (1998) (additional

citations omitted). Furthermore, "due process is not a concept rigidly applied to every
adversarial confrontation, but instead is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections
as are warranted by the particular situation." Id at 226, 970 P .2d at 19. (Additional citations
omitted).
-34-

For purposes of determining whether an individual's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. Id. It
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or property interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (Additional citations omitted).
Only after a court finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis,
in which it determines what process is due. Id. (Additional citations omitted).
Whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the
particular statute or ordinance in question. Id. (Additional citations omitted.) A person must
have more than an abstract need or desire for a benefit in order to have a property interest therein.
Id. at 227, 970 P.2d at 20. (Additional citations omitted.) Further, that person must have more

than a unilateral expectation in the benefit; instead, she must have a "legitimate claim of
entitlement to it." Id. (Additional citations omitted.)
"The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the
security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Id. at 226, 970 P.2d
at 19, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
Examples of potentially protected property interests include drivers' licenses, welfare
benefits, unemployment insurance, homestead exemptions, Social Security, workers'
compensation and medical licenses. See, Ides, Allan and Christopher N. May, Examples &
Explanations: Constitutional Law - Individual Rights, 2nd Ed., Aspen Law & Business, 2001.
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Piercy has failed to support his argument that open range status is a clearly protected
property interest requiring due process before its deprived. He has cited no authority for that
position.
It is obvious that the "right" for one's cattle to "roam free" is not a property right at all.

Piercy has a property right in his cattle, and in his land where they are pastured. Piercy has no
more of a property right in open range than he does to drive 30 miles per hour on a street with a
speed limit now set at 20 miles per hour.
Furthermore, title 25, chapter 24, Idaho Code demonstrates there is no such constitutional
right because it grants counties the right to create herd districts. See Idaho Code § 25-2401. The
statutes do not entitle Piercy to certain benefits, nor do they create an expectation that property is
open range. Piercy has no legitimate claim of entitlement to open range property status.
Consequently, he does not have a property interest protected by the constitution.
Even assuming Piercy does have a protected property interest, Piercy has failed to show
the statutes providing notice and an opportunity to be heard violate due process. Rather, Piercy
asserts the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 somehow violates the statutory provision
regarding notice and an opportunity to be heard. This argument is flawed.
It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not

prohibit a state from attaching reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal
constitutional rights. Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 534, 944 P.2d 127, 131 (Ct. App.1997)
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(additional citations omitted). The test is whether the defendant has had "a reasonable
opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined." Id. (Additional
citations omitted.)
The current statute of limitations for a challenge to the validity of an ordinance is four (4)
years pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-224. The 2009 amendment expanded the statute of limitations
to seven (7) years. Even applied retroactively, four or seven years is more than a reasonable
amount of time in which to pursue a claim for relief. See Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535, 944 P.2d at
132 (reaffirming that a one year statute of limitations is a reasonable amount of time within
which to file an application for post-conviction relief.)
Therefore, there is no merit to Piercy's argument that retroactive application ofldaho
Code § 31-587 is a procedural due process violation.

c.

The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 Does Not Violate
Substantive Due Process.

The United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against state deprivation of a person's
"life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding
County, 148 Idaho 653, 661, 227 P.3d 907, 915 (2010), citing U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,§ 1;
Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13. In order to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the state action
that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must be arbitrary, capricious, or without a
rational basis. Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n Inc., 148 Idaho at 661, 227 P.3d at 915, citing Pace v.
Hymas, 111Idaho581, 586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 (1986). Conversely, a substantive due process
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violation will not be found if the state action "bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible
legislative objective." Id., citing McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P.2d 911, 918
(Ct.App.1990) (citing State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct.App.1984)).
Piercy' s claim the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 violates substantive due
process is without merit.
As argued above, there is no evidence or case law supporting Piercy's claim that he has a
constitutionally protected property interest.
Additionally, Piercy has made no showing that the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31857 is "arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis." To the contrary, the basis for the
amendment is plainly rational, as it prevents individuals from challenging decades old herd
districts that have been in existence for decades for alleged procedural irregularities in their
enactment. The 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 bears a reasonable relationship to a
permissible legislative objective.
The 2009 amendment precludes a challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps
preceding certain orders of the board of county commissioners after seven (7) years from the date
of the order. The purpose of the amendment, as discussed in greater detail above, is to protect
existing school, road, herd, or other districts from stale claims. Similar to the facts of this case,
many of these districts have been in existence for decades. A challenge to the creation of such
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districts would require review of evidence that through the passage of time no longer exists due
to destruction or death, and/or reliance on faded memories.
Therefore, the amendment is valid because the government has sufficient reason to avoid
stale claims. Furthermore, the expressed legislative purpose of the 2009 amendment is to
"eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures sued by the County
Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in place and have been relied upon by
the citizens and the county." See Statement of Purpose, Idaho Code § 31-587. Such purpose
clearly bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective.
Finally, it is well-established the legislature may establish statutes oflimitations. See,
e.g., Stuart, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010). Because such authority is vested in the

legislature, there cannot be a substantive due process violation.

7.

There is No Basis for Piercy's Requested "Correction" of the Court's
Findings.

Piercy argues that Judge Ford "misstated" facts in ruling on Piercy's opportunity to be
heard. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 33-36. The issues raised in this section are nowhere to be
found in Piercy's Notice of Appeal or Amended Notice of Appeal. (See R., pp. 1426-1436
(Notice of Appeal) and pp. 1437-1447 (Amended Notice of Appeal).
Piercy has presented this Court with no authority for his request that this Court "correct"
Judge Ford's factual conclusions, none of which have any bearing on the issue of whether
Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district is barred by the statute oflimitations. Nor are Judge
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Ford's conclusions "relevant" to "Mr. Piercy's constitutional and substantive arguments." See
Appellant's Brief, p. 36. Certainly Piercy must do more than just state conclusions. He has not
explained how these facts are relevant to his procedural and substantive due process claims, nor
provided any authority to the Court that would permit it to correct what Piercy contends are
errors in the district's court's factual conclusions.
Accordingly, this Court should reject Piercy's invitation.

V. CONCLUSION
The Idaho Legislature has answered the question of how long is too long to challenge a
herd district with the answer "7 years." Before it amended Idaho Code § 31-587 in 2009, the
answer to the question was "four years" under Idaho Code § 5-224. This Court should not open
the Pandora's Box of permitting civil defendants to avoid civil liability by collaterally attacking
the process by which laws that have applied to them for decades were passed.
DATED this

_l1t day of March, 2013.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
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